The village of Borodino where the battle took place in 1812. Day of the Battle of Borodino. Aggressive discontent in society

The Battle of Borodino in 1812 is a battle that lasted only one day, but has been preserved in the history of the planet among the most important world events. Napoleon took this blow, hoping to quickly conquer the Russian Empire, but his plans were not destined to come true. It is believed that the Battle of Borodino was the first stage in the fall of the famous conqueror. What is known about the battle that Lermontov glorified in his famous work?

Battle of Borodino 1812: background

This was a time when Bonaparte’s troops had already managed to subjugate almost all of continental Europe, and the emperor’s power even extended to Africa. He himself emphasized in conversations with those close to him that in order to gain world domination, all he had to do was gain control over Russian lands.

To conquer Russian territory, he assembled an army of approximately 600 thousand people. The army rapidly advanced deeper into the state. However, Napoleon's soldiers died one after another under the attack of peasant militias, their health deteriorated due to the unusually difficult climate and poor nutrition. Nevertheless, the advance of the army continued, the French goal being the capital.

The bloody Battle of Borodino in 1812 became part of the tactics used by Russian commanders. They weakened the enemy army with minor battles, biding their time for a decisive blow.

Main stages

The Battle of Borodino in 1812 was actually a chain consisting of several clashes with French troops, which resulted in huge losses on both sides. The first was the battle for the village of Borodino, which is located approximately 125 km from Moscow. On the Russian side, de Tolly took part in it, and on the enemy side, the Beauharnais corps.

The Battle of Borodino in 1812 was in full swing when the battle took place. It involved 15 divisions of French marshals and two Russians, led by Vorontsov and Neverovsky. At this stage, Bagration received a serious wound, which forced him to entrust command to Konovnitsyn.

By the time the Russian soldiers left the flushes, the Battle of Borodino (1812) had already been going on for about 14 hours. A summary of further events: the Russians are located behind the Semenovsky ravine, where the third battle takes place. Its participants are people who attacked flushes and defended them. The French received reinforcements, which became the cavalry under the leadership of Nansouty. Uvarov's cavalry hastened to help the Russian troops, and the Cossacks under the command of Platov also approached.

Battery Raevsky

Separately, it is worth considering the final stage of such an event as the Battle of Borodino (1812). Summary: the battles for what went down in history as the “grave of the French cavalry” lasted about 7 hours. This place really became the grave for many of Bonaparte's soldiers.

Historians remain perplexed as to why the Russian army abandoned the Shevadinsky redoubt. It is possible that the commander-in-chief deliberately opened the left flank in order to divert the enemy's attention from the right. His goal was to protect the new Smolensk road, using which Napoleon’s army would quickly approach Moscow.

Many historically important documents have been preserved that shed light on such an event as the war of 1812. The Battle of Borodino is mentioned in a letter that was sent by Kutuzov to the Russian emperor even before it began. The commander informed the Tsar that the terrain features (open fields) would provide the Russian troops with optimal positions.

Hundred per minute

The Battle of Borodino (1812) is briefly and extensively covered in so many historical sources that one gets the impression that it took a very long time. In reality, the battle, which began on September 7 at half past six in the morning, lasted less than a day. Of course, it turned out to be one of the bloodiest among all the short battles.

It’s no secret how many lives the Battle of Borodino took and its bloody contribution. Historians have not been able to establish the exact number of those killed; they call 80-100 thousand dead on both sides. Calculations show that every minute at least a hundred soldiers were sent to the next world.

Heroes

The Patriotic War of 1812 gave many commanders their well-deserved glory. The Battle of Borodino, of course, immortalized a man like Kutuzov. By the way, Mikhail Illarionovich at that time was not yet a gray-haired old man whose one eye did not open. At the time of the battle, he was still an energetic, albeit aging man, and was not wearing his signature headband.

Of course, Kutuzov was not the only hero who was glorified by Borodino. Together with him, Bagration, Raevsky, and de Tolly entered history. It is interesting that the last of them did not enjoy authority among the troops, although he was the author of the brilliant idea to field partisan forces against the enemy army. If you believe the legend, during the Battle of Borodino, the general lost his horses three times, which died under a barrage of shells and bullets, but he himself remained unharmed.

Who has the victory?

Perhaps this question remains the main intrigue of the bloody battle, since both sides participating in it have their own opinion on this matter. French historians are convinced that Napoleon's troops won a great victory that day. Russian scientists insist on the opposite; their theory was once supported by Alexander the First, who proclaimed the Battle of Borodino an absolute victory for Russia. By the way, it was after him that Kutuzov was awarded the rank of Field Marshal.

It is known that Bonaparte was not satisfied with the reports that his military leaders provided. The number of guns captured from the Russians turned out to be minimal, as well as the number of prisoners that the retreating army took with them. It is believed that the conqueror was completely crushed by the morale of the enemy.

The large-scale battle, which began on September 7 near the village of Borodino, has inspired writers, poets, artists, and then directors who covered it in their works for two centuries. You can recall both the painting “The Hussar Ballad” and the famous creation of Lermontov, which is now being taught at school.

What was the Battle of Borodino 1812 really like and how did it turn out for the Russians and French? Buntman and Eidelman are historians who created a laconic and accurate text that covers the bloody battle in detail. Critics praise this work for its impeccable knowledge of the era, vivid images of the heroes of the battle (on both sides), thanks to which all the events are easy to imagine. The book is a must read for those seriously interested in history and military affairs.

Background

Since the beginning of the invasion of the French army into the territory of the Russian Empire in June of the year, Russian troops have been constantly retreating. The rapid advance and overwhelming numerical superiority of the French made it impossible for the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, General Barclay de Tolly, to prepare troops for battle. The prolonged retreat caused public discontent, so Alexander I removed Barclay de Tolly and appointed General of the Infantry Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. However, he also had to retreat in order to gain time to gather all his forces.

On August 22 (Old Style), the Russian army, retreating from Smolensk, settled down near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow, where Kutuzov decided to give a general battle; it was impossible to postpone it further, since Emperor Alexander demanded that Kutuzov stop Napoleon’s advance towards Moscow. On August 24 (September 5), the Battle of Shevardinsky Redoubt took place, which delayed the French troops and enabled the Russians to build fortifications in the main positions.

Alignment of forces at the beginning of the battle

Number

The total number of the Russian army is determined by memoirists and historians in a wide range of 110-150 thousand people:

The discrepancies are mainly related to the militia; the number of participants in the battle is not precisely known. The militia were untrained, most armed only with pikes. They mainly performed auxiliary functions, such as building fortifications and carrying the wounded from the battlefield. The discrepancy in the number of regular troops is caused by the fact that the problem has not been resolved whether all the recruits brought by Miloradovich and Pavlishchev (about 10 thousand) were included in the regiments before the battle.

The size of the French army is estimated more definitely: 130-150 thousand people and 587 guns:

However, taking into account the militias in the Russian army implies adding to the regular French army numerous “non-combatants” who were present in the French camp and whose combat effectiveness corresponded to the Russian militias. In this case, the size of the French army will also increase by 15-20 thousand (up to 150 thousand) people. Like Russian militias, French non-combatants performed auxiliary functions - they carried out the wounded, carried water, etc.

It is important for military history to distinguish between the total size of an army on the battlefield and the troops that were committed to battle. However, in terms of the balance of forces that took direct part in the battle of August 26, the French army also had a numerical superiority. According to the encyclopedia “Patriotic War of 1812”, at the end of the battle Napoleon had 18 thousand in reserve, and Kutuzov had 8-9 thousand regular troops (in particular the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky guards regiments), that is, the difference in reserves was 9-10 thousand people against a two to three times greater difference in the number of regular troops of the armies at the beginning of the battle. At the same time, Kutuzov said that the Russians brought into battle “every last reserve, even the guard by evening,” “all reserves are already in action.” However, it should be borne in mind that Kutuzov asserted this with the aim of justifying the retreat. Meanwhile, it is reliably known that a number of Russian units (for example, the 4th, 30th, 48th Jaeger Regiments) did not take direct part in the battle, but only suffered losses from enemy artillery fire.

If we evaluate the qualitative composition of the two armies, we can turn to the opinion of the Marquis of Chambray, a participant in the events, who noted that the French army had superiority, since its infantry consisted mainly of experienced soldiers, while the Russians had many recruits. In addition, the French had a significant superiority in heavy cavalry.

Starting position

The initial position chosen by Kutuzov looked like a straight line running from the Shevardinsky redoubt on the left flank through a large battery, later called the Raevsky battery, the village of Borodino in the center to the village of Maslovo on the right flank. Leaving the Shevardinsky redoubt, the 2nd Army bent its left flank beyond the river. Kamenka and the battle formation of the army took the form of an obtuse angle. The two flanks of the Russian position occupied 4 km each, but were not equivalent. The right flank was formed by Barclay de Tolly's 1st Army, consisting of 3 infantry. and 3 cavalry. corps and reserves (76 thousand people, 480 guns), the front of his position was covered by the Kolocha River. The left flank was formed by Bagration's smaller 2nd Army (34 thousand people, 156 guns). In addition, the left flank did not have strong natural obstacles in front of the front like the right. After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt on August 24 (September 5), the position of the left flank became even more vulnerable and relied only on three unfinished flushes.

However, on the eve of the battle, the 3rd Inf. Tuchkov's corps of the 1st was withdrawn from an ambush behind the left flank by order of Chief of Staff Bennigsen without the knowledge of Kutuzov. Bennigsen's actions are justified by his intention to follow the formal battle plan.

Around the same time, Junot's 8th French (Westphalian) Corps made its way through the Utitsky forest to the rear of the flushes. The situation was saved by the 1st cavalry battery, which at that time was heading to the flash area. Its commander, Captain Zakharov, seeing a threat to the flushes from the rear, hastily deployed his guns and opened fire on the enemy, who was building up to attack. 4 infantry arrived in time. The regiment of Baggovut's 2nd corps pushed Junot's corps into the Utitsky forest, inflicting significant losses on it. Russian historians claim that during the second offensive, Junot's corps was defeated in a bayonet counterattack, but Westphalian and French sources completely refute this. According to the recollections of direct participants, the 8th Corps participated in the battle until the evening.

According to Kutuzov's plan, Tuchkov's corps was supposed to suddenly attack the flank and rear of the enemy, who was fighting for Bagration's flushes, from an ambush. However, early in the morning, Chief of Staff L.L. Bennigsen advanced Tuchkov’s detachment from an ambush.

Around 9 am, in the midst of the battle for Bagration's flushes, the French launched the first attack on the battery with the forces of the 4th Corps of Eugene Beauharnais, as well as the divisions of Morand and Gerard from the 1st Corps of Marshal Davout. By influencing the center of the Russian army, Napoleon hoped to complicate the transfer of troops from the right wing of the Russian army to Bagration's flushes and thereby ensure his main forces a quick defeat of the left wing of the Russian army. By the time of the attack, the entire second line of Raevsky’s troops, by order of Bagration, had been withdrawn to protect the flushes. Despite this, the attack was repulsed by artillery fire.

Almost immediately, Beauharnais re-attacked the mound. Kutuzov at that moment brought into battle for the Raevsky battery the entire horse artillery reserve in the amount of 60 guns and part of the light artillery of the 1st Army. However, despite the dense artillery fire, the French of the 30th regiment of General Bonamy managed to break into the redoubt.

At that moment, the chief of staff of the 1st Army, A.P. Ermolov, and the chief of artillery, A.I. Kutaisov, were near the Kurgan Heights, following Kutuzov’s orders to the left flank. Having led the battalion of the Ufa Regiment and joining it with the 18th Jaeger Regiment, Ermolov and A.I. Kutaisov attacked with bayonets directly at the redoubt. At the same time, the regiments of Paskevich and Vasilchikov attacked from the flanks. The redoubt was recaptured and Brigadier General Bonamy was captured. Of the entire French regiment under the command of Bonamy (4,100 people), only about 300 soldiers remained in the ranks. Artillery Major General Kutaisov died in the battle for the battery.

Despite the steepness of the sunrise, I ordered the Jaeger regiments and the 3rd battalion of the Ufa Regiment to attack with bayonets, the favorite weapon of the Russian soldier. The fierce and terrible battle did not last more than half an hour: desperate resistance was met, the high ground was taken away, the guns were returned. Brigadier General Bonamy, wounded by bayonets, was spared [captured], and there were no prisoners. The damage from our side is very great and is far from commensurate with the number of attacking battalions.

Chief of Staff of the 1st Army A.P. Ermolov

Kutuzov, noticing the complete exhaustion of Raevsky’s corps, withdrew his troops to the second line. Barclay de Tolly sends the 24th infantry to the battery to defend the battery. Likhachev's division.

After the fall of Bagration's flushes, Napoleon abandoned the development of an offensive against the left wing of the Russian army. The initial plan to break through the defense on this wing in order to reach the rear of the main forces of the Russian army became meaningless, since a significant part of these troops fell out of action in the battles for the flushes themselves, while the defense on the left wing, despite the loss of the flushes, remained undefeated . Noticing that the situation in the center of the Russian troops had worsened, Napoleon decided to redirect his forces to the Raevsky battery. However, the next attack was delayed for two hours, since at that time Russian cavalry and Cossacks appeared in the rear of the French.

Taking advantage of the respite, Kutuzov moved the 4th infantry from the right flank to the center. Corps of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy and 2nd Cav. Corps of Major General Korf. Napoleon ordered increased fire on the mass of infantry of the 4th Corps. According to eyewitnesses, the Russians moved like machines, closing ranks as they moved. The path of the corps could be traced along the trail of the bodies of the dead.

General Miloradovich, commander of the center of Russian troops, ordered Adjutant Bibikov to find Evgeniy of Württemberg and tell him to go to Miloradovich. Bibikov found Yevgeny, but because of the roar of the cannonade, no words could be heard, and the adjutant waved his hand, indicating the location of Miloradovich. At that moment, a flying cannonball tore off his hand. Bibikov, falling from his horse, again pointed in the direction with his other hand.

According to the memoirs of the commander of the 4th Infantry Division,
General Eugene of Württemberg

Osterman-Tolstoy's troops joined the left flank to the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments, located south of the battery. Behind them were the cavalrymen of the 2nd Corps and the approaching Cavalry and Horse Guard regiments.

At about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the French opened crossfire from the front and flashes of 150 guns at Raevsky's battery and began an attack. 34 cavalry regiments were concentrated to attack against the 24th Division. The 2nd Cavalry was the first to attack. corps under the command of General Auguste Caulaincourt (the corps commander, General Montbrun, had been killed by this time). Caulaincourt broke through the hellish fire, walked around the Kurgan Heights on the left and rushed to Raevsky’s battery. Met from the front, flanks and rear by persistent fire from the defenders, the cuirassiers were driven back with huge losses (Raevsky’s battery received the nickname “the grave of the French cavalry” from the French for these losses). Caulaincourt, like many of his comrades, found death on the slopes of the mound.

Meanwhile, Beauharnais's troops, taking advantage of Caulaincourt's attack, which constrained the actions of the 24th division, broke into the battery from the front and flank. A bloody battle took place at the battery. The wounded General Likhachev was captured. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Raevsky's battery fell.

Having received news of the fall of Raevsky's battery, at 17 o'clock Napoleon moved to the center of the Russian army and came to the conclusion that its center, despite the retreat and contrary to the assurances of his retinue, had not been shaken. After this, he refused requests to bring the guard into the battle. The French offensive on the center of the Russian army stopped.

End of the battle

After the French troops occupied the battery, the battle began to subside. On the left flank, Poniatovsky carried out ineffective attacks against Dokhturov's 2nd Army. In the center and on the right flank, matters were limited to artillery fire until 7 pm.

At 12 o'clock at night, Kutuzov's order arrived, canceling preparations for the battle scheduled for the next day. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army decided to withdraw the army beyond Mozhaisk in order to make up for human losses and better prepare for new battles. The organized withdrawal of Kutuzov is evidenced by the French General Armand Caulaincourt (brother of the deceased General Auguste Caulaincourt), who was at the Battle of Napoleon and therefore well informed.

The Emperor repeated many times that he could not understand how the redoubts and positions which had been captured with such courage and which we had so stubbornly defended gave us only a small number of prisoners. He asked many times the officers who arrived with reports where the prisoners who were supposed to be taken were. He even sent to the appropriate points to make sure that no other prisoners had been taken. These successes without prisoners, without trophies did not satisfy him...
The enemy carried off the vast majority of their wounded, and we only got those prisoners that I already mentioned, 12 guns of the redoubt ... and three or four others taken in the first attacks.

Chronology of the battle

Chronology of the battle. The most significant battles

Designations: † - death or mortal wound, / - captivity, % - wound

There is also an alternative point of view on the chronology of the Battle of Borodino. See, for example,.

Result of the battle

Colorized engraving of Sharon. 1st quarter of the 19th century

Russian casualty estimates

The number of losses of the Russian army has been repeatedly revised by historians. Different sources give different numbers:

According to the surviving reports from the RGVIA archive, the Russian army lost 39,300 people killed, wounded and missing (21,766 in the 1st Army, 17,445 in the 2nd Army), but taking into account the fact that the data in the reports for various reasons is incomplete (do not include losses of the militia and Cossacks), historians increase this number to 45 thousand people.

French casualty estimates

Most of the documentation of the Grande Armée was lost during the retreat, making it extremely difficult to estimate French losses. The losses of officers and generals have been established, which significantly exceed those in the Russian army (see below). Due to the fact that the Russian troops were no more saturated with officers than the French, these data are not fundamentally consistent with assumptions about lower overall French losses, but indicate the opposite. The question of the total losses of the French army remains open.

The most common figure in French historiography for the losses of the Napoleonic army of 30 thousand is based on the calculations of the French officer Denier, who served as an inspector at Napoleon's General Staff, who determined the total French losses during the three days of the battle of Borodino at 49 generals and 28,000 lower ranks, of which 6,550 killed and 21,450 wounded. These figures were classified by order of Marshal Berthier due to a discrepancy with the data in Napoleon's bulletin about losses of 8-10 thousand and were published for the first time in the city. The figure of 30 thousand given in the literature was obtained by rounding Denier's data.

But later studies showed that Denier's data were greatly underestimated. Thus, Denier gives the number of 269 killed officers of the Grand Army. However, in 1899, the French historian Martinien, based on surviving documents, established that at least 460 officers, known by name, were killed. Subsequent studies increased this number to 480. Even French historians admit that “since the information given in the statement about the generals and colonels who were out of action at Borodino is inaccurate and underestimated, it can be assumed that the rest of Denier’s figures are based on incomplete data.” . If we assume that the total losses of the French army are underestimated by Denier in the same proportion as the losses of officers, then a simple calculation based on incomplete data from Marignen gives an approximate estimate of 28,086x460/269 = 48,003 (48 thousand people). For the number 480, the corresponding result is 50,116. This figure concerns the losses of regular troops only and should be correlated with the losses of regular Russian units (approx. 39,000 people).

The French historian, retired general Segur estimated the French losses at Borodino at 40 thousand soldiers and officers. The writer Horace Vernet called the number of French losses “up to 50 thousand” and believed that Napoleon failed to win the Battle of Borodino. This estimate of French losses is one of the highest given by French historians, although based on data from the Russian side.

In Russian literature, the number of French casualties was often given as 58,478. This number is based on false information from the defector Alexander Schmidt, who allegedly served in Berthier's office. Subsequently, this figure was picked up by patriotic researchers and indicated on the Main Monument. However, the proof of the falsity of the data provided by Schmidt does not cancel the historical discussion about French losses in the region of 60 thousand people, based on other sources.

One of the sources that can, in the absence of documentation from the French army, shed light on the losses of the French, is data on the total number of those buried on the Borodino field. The burial and burning were carried out by the Russians. According to Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, a total of 58,521 bodies of those killed were buried and burned. Russian historians and, in particular, employees of the museum-reserve on the Borodino field estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48-50 thousand people. According to A. Sukhanov’s data on the Borodino field and in the surrounding villages, without including French burials, 49,887 dead were buried in the Kolotsky Monastery. Based on the losses killed in the Russian army (maximum estimate - 15 thousand) and adding to them the Russian wounded who subsequently died on the field (there were no more than 8 thousand of them, since out of 30 thousand wounded 22 thousand were taken to Moscow) , the number of French people buried on the battlefield alone is estimated at 27 thousand people. In the Kolotsky monastery, where the main military hospital of the French army was located, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th linear regiment, Ch. Francois, 3/4 of the wounded died in the 10 days following the battle - an indefinite number measured in thousands. This result returns to the estimate of French losses of 20 thousand killed and 40 thousand wounded, indicated on the monument. This assessment is consistent with the conclusions of modern French historians about the severe underestimation of losses of 30,000 people, and is confirmed by the very course of the battle, in which the French troops, which during the attacks outnumbered the Russian troops by 2-3 times, due to some objective reasons, were not able to develop their success . Among European historians, the figure of losses of 60 thousand is not widespread.

The losses of the officers of the parties amounted to: Russians - 211 killed and approx. 1180 wounded; French - 480 killed and 1,448 wounded.

The losses of the generals of the parties in killed and wounded were: Russian - 23 generals; French - 49 generals.

Grand total

After the 1st day of the battle, the Russian army left the battlefield and no longer interfered with Napoleon's advance on Moscow. The Russian army failed to force Napoleon's army to abandon its intentions (to occupy Moscow).

After dark, the French army was in the same positions in which it was before the start of the battle, and Kutuzov, due to large losses and small numbers of reserves, given that reinforcements had already approached Napoleon - fresh divisions of Pinault and Delaborde (about 11 thousand people) , decided to continue the retreat, thus opening the way to Moscow, but preserving the army and the opportunity to continue the fight. Kutuzov’s decision was also influenced by the fact that the size of Napoleon’s army before the start of the battle was estimated at 160-180 thousand people (Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky).

Napoleon, who tried to defeat the Russian army in one battle, was able to achieve partial displacement of Russian troops from their positions with comparable losses. At the same time, he was sure that it was impossible to achieve more in the battle, since Napoleon did not consider the refusal to bring the guard into battle to be wrong. " The attack by the guard might not have had any consequences. The enemy still showed quite firmness"- Napoleon noted much later. In conversations with private individuals, Napoleon clearly assessed both his capabilities in the Battle of Borodino and the danger of a Russian counterattack on the exhausted French army. After the fight for flushes, he no longer hoped to defeat the Russian army. Military historian General Jomini quotes him as saying: “ As soon as we captured the position of the left flank, I was already sure that the enemy would retreat during the night. Why was it voluntarily exposed to the dangerous consequences of the new Poltava?».

Napoleon's official point of view was expressed in his memoirs. In 1816 he dictated on St. Helena:

The Battle of Moscow is my greatest battle: it is a clash of giants. The Russians had 170 thousand people under arms; they had all the advantages: numerical superiority in infantry, cavalry, artillery, excellent position. They were defeated! The undaunted heroes, Ney, Murat, Poniatovsky - that’s who owned the glory of this battle. How many great, how many beautiful historical deeds will be noted in it! She will tell how these brave cuirassiers captured the redoubts, cutting down the gunners on their guns; she will tell about the heroic self-sacrifice of Montbrun and Caulaincourt, who met death at the height of their glory; it will tell how our gunners, exposed on a level field, fired against more numerous and well-fortified batteries, and about these fearless infantrymen who, at the most critical moment, when the general who commanded them wanted to encourage them, shouted to him: “Calm, all your soldiers decided to win today, and they will win!”

A year later, in 1817, Napoleon decided to give a new version of the Battle of Borodino:

With an army of 80,000, I rushed at the Russians, who were 250,000 strong, armed to the teeth and defeated them...

Kutuzov also considered this battle his victory. In his report to Alexander I, he wrote:

The battle on the 26th was the bloodiest of all those known in modern times. We completely won the battlefield, and the enemy then retreated to the position in which he came to attack us.

Alexander I declared the Battle of Borodino as a victory. Prince Kutuzov was promoted to field marshal with an award of 100 thousand rubles. All lower ranks who were in the battle were granted five rubles each.

The Battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century. According to the most conservative estimates of total losses, 2,500 people died on the field every hour. Some divisions lost up to 80% of their strength. The French fired 60 thousand cannon shots and almost one and a half million rifle shots. It is no coincidence that Napoleon called the battle of Borodino his greatest battle, although its results were more than modest for a great commander accustomed to victories.

The Russian army retreated, but retained its combat effectiveness and soon expelled Napoleon from Russia.

Notes

1. ; The quotation presented by Mikhnevich was compiled by him from a free translation of Napoleon's oral statements. The primary sources do not convey Napoleon’s similar phrase in exactly this form, but the review as edited by Mikhnevich is widely quoted in modern literature.
2. Extract from the notes of General Pele on the Russian War of 1812, “Readings of the Imperial Society for the History of Antiquities”, 1872, I, p. 1-121
3. Some of the bloodiest one-day battles in history (“The Economist” Nov 11th 2008). Retrieved April 30, 2009.
4. M. Bogdanovich, History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources, vol. 2, St. Petersburg, 1859, p. 162.
   Bogdanovich's data is repeated in ESBE.
5. Tarle, “Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia”, OGIZ, 1943, p. 162
6. Russian united armies at Borodino August 24-26 (September 5-7) 1812 Alexey Vasiliev, Andrey Eliseev
7. Tarle, “Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia”, OGIZ, 1943, p. 172
8. Zemtsov V.N. Battle of the Moscow River. - M.: 2001.
9. http://www.auditorium.ru/books/2556/gl4.pdf Troitsky N. A. 1812. The Great Year of Russia. M., 1989.
10. Chambray G. Histoire de I'expedition de Russie.P., 1838
11. Clausewitz, Campaign in Russia 1812 “... on the flank where it was necessary to expect an enemy attack. This, undoubtedly, was the left flank; One of the advantages of the Russian position was that this could be foreseen with complete confidence.”
12. Borodino, Tarle E.V.
13. Tarle, “Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia”, OGIZ, 1943, p. 167
14. http://www.auditorium.ru/books/2556/gl4.pdf Troitsky N. A. 1812. THE GREAT YEAR OF RUSSIA
15. Caulaincourt, “Napoleon’s Campaign in Russia”, chapter 3. Retrieved April 30, 2009.
16. Inscription on the Main Monument. 2nd side: “1838 - Grateful fatherland who laid their bellies on the field of honor - Russians: Generals Killed - 3 Wounded - 12 Warriors Killed - 15,000 Wounded - 30,000"
17. BATTLE AT KOLOTSK MONASTERY, SHEVARDIN AND BORODINO AUGUST 24 AND 26, 1812 (V). Retrieved April 30, 2009.
18. The historian Tarle in “Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia” repeats these figures from historians A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky and M. I. Bogdanovich)
19. Mikheev S.P. History of the Russian Army. Vol. 3: The era of wars with Napoleon I. - M.: edition of S. Mikheev and A. Kazachkov, 1911. - P. 60
20. About the losses of the Russian army in the battle of Borodino on August 24-26, 1812. article by S. V. Lvov
21. P. Denniee. Itineraire de l'Empereur Napoleon. Paris, 1842
22. Martinien A. Tableaux par corps et par batailles des officiers tues et blesses pendant les guerres de l’Empire (1805-1815). P., 1899;
23. Henri Lashuk. "Napoleon: campaigns and battles 1796-1815"
24. Horace Vernet, “The History of Napoleon,” 1839. In describing the battle of Borodino, Vernet used the work of Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, as written in the corresponding chapter.
25. Losses of the French army at Borodino. Article by A. Vasiliev “... Of the many errors found in the Swiss’s information, it is enough to point out one. Among the corps that fought at Borodino, he named the 7th (Saxon) corps of General Rainier, who allegedly lost 5,095 people in this battle. In fact, this corps could not have participated in the Battle of Borodino, since at that time it was operating in Volyn.”

The largest event of the Patriotic War of 1812 occurred on August 26, 125 kilometers from Moscow. The Battle of Borodino Field is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century. Its significance in Russian history is colossal; the loss of Borodino threatened the complete capitulation of the Russian Empire.

The commander-in-chief of the Russian troops, M.I. Kutuzov, planned to make further French offensives impossible, while the enemy wanted to completely defeat the Russian army and capture Moscow. The forces of the parties were almost equal to one hundred thirty-two thousand Russians against one hundred thirty-five thousand French, the number of guns was 640 against 587, respectively.

At 6 o'clock in the morning the French began their offensive. In order to clear the road to Moscow, they tried to break through the center of the Russian troops and bypass their left flank, but the attempt ended in failure. The most terrible battles took place on Bagration's flashes and General Raevsky's battery. Soldiers were dying at the rate of 100 per minute. By six o'clock in the evening the French had captured only the central battery. Later, Bonaparte ordered the withdrawal of forces, but Mikhail Illarionovich also decided to retreat to Moscow.

In fact, the battle did not give victory to anyone. The losses were enormous for both sides, Russia mourned the death of 44 thousand soldiers, France and its allies 60 thousand soldiers.

The Tsar demanded another decisive battle, so the entire general headquarters was convened in Fili, near Moscow. At this council the fate of Moscow was decided. Kutuzov opposed the battle; the army was not ready, he believed. Moscow was surrendered without a fight - this decision became the most correct in recent years.

Patriotic War.

Battle of Borodino 1812 (about the Battle of Borodino) for children

The Battle of Borodino of 1812 is one of the large-scale battles of the Patriotic War of 1812. It went down in history as one of the bloodiest events in the nineteenth century. The battle took place between the Russians and the French. It began on September 7, 1812, near the village of Borodino. This date personifies the victory of the Russian people over the French. The significance of the Battle of Borodino is enormous, since if the Russian Empire had been defeated, this would have resulted in complete surrender.

On September 7, Napoleon and his army attacked the Russian Empire without declaring war. Due to their unpreparedness for battle, Russian troops were forced to retreat deeper into the country. This action caused complete misunderstanding and indignation on the part of the people, and Alexander was the first to appoint M.I. as commander-in-chief. Kutuzova.

At first, Kutuzov also had to retreat in order to gain time. By this time, Napoleonic army had already suffered significant losses and the number of its soldiers had decreased. Taking advantage of this moment, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army decides to fight the final battle near the village of Borodino. On September 7, 1812, early in the morning, a grandiose battle began. Russian soldiers withstood the enemy's attack for six hours. The losses were colossal on both sides. The Russians were forced to retreat, but were still able to maintain the ability to continue the battle. Napoleon did not achieve his main goal; he was unable to defeat the army.

Kutuzov decided to involve small partisan detachments in the battle. Thus, by the end of December, Napoleon’s army was practically destroyed, and its remainder was put to flight. However, the result of this battle is controversial to this day. It was unclear who should be considered the winner, since both Kutuzov and Napoleon officially declared their victory. But still, the French army was expelled from the Russian Empire without capturing the desired lands. Later, Bonaparte will remember the Battle of Borodino as one of the most terrible in his life. The consequences of the battle were much more severe for Napoleon than for the Russians. The morale of the soldiers was completely broken. The huge losses of people were irreparable. The French lost fifty-nine thousand men, forty-seven of whom were generals. The Russian army lost only thirty-nine thousand people, of whom twenty-nine were generals.

Currently, the day of the battle of Borodino is widely celebrated in Russia. Reconstructions of these military events are regularly carried out on the battlefield.

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Background

Alignment of forces at the beginning of the battle

Number of troops

If we evaluate the qualitative composition of the two armies, we can turn to the opinion of the Marquis of Chambray, a participant in the events, who noted that the French army had superiority, since its infantry consisted mainly of experienced soldiers, while the Russians had many recruits. In addition, the French had a significant superiority in heavy cavalry.

Starting position

The idea of ​​the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, was to inflict as many losses as possible on the French troops through active defense, change the balance of forces, preserve Russian troops for further battles and for the complete defeat of the French army. In accordance with this plan, the battle formation of the Russian troops was built.

The initial position chosen by Kutuzov looked like a straight line running from the Shevardinsky redoubt on the left flank through the large battery on Red Hill, later called the Raevsky battery, the village of Borodino in the center, to the village of Maslovo on the right flank. Leaving the Shevardinsky redoubt, the 2nd Army bent its left flank beyond the Kamenka River, and the army’s battle formation took the form of an obtuse angle. Both flanks of the Russian position occupied 4 km, but were unequal. The right flank was formed by the 1st Army of Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, consisting of 3 infantry, 3 cavalry corps and reserves (76 thousand people, 480 guns), the front of its position was covered by the Kolocha River. The left flank was formed by the smaller 2nd Army of Infantry General Bagration (34 thousand people, 156 guns). In addition, the left flank did not have such strong natural obstacles in front of the front as the right. After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt on August 24 (September 5), the position of the left flank became even more vulnerable and relied only on 3 unfinished flushes.

Thus, in the center and on the right wing of the Russian position, Kutuzov placed 4 infantry corps out of 7, as well as 3 cavalry corps and Platov’s Cossack corps. According to Kutuzov’s plan, such a powerful group of troops would reliably cover the Moscow direction and at the same time allow, if necessary, to strike the flank and rear of the French troops. The battle formation of the Russian army was deep and allowed for wide maneuvers of forces on the battlefield. The first line of battle formation of the Russian troops consisted of infantry corps, the second line - cavalry corps, and the third - reserves. Kutuzov highly appreciated the role of reserves, indicating in the disposition for the battle: “ Reserves must be protected as long as possible, because the general who still retains the reserve will not be defeated» .

To accomplish the task, Napoleon began to concentrate his main forces (up to 95 thousand) in the area of ​​the Shevardinsky redoubt on the evening of August 25 (September 6). The total number of French troops in front of the 2nd Army front reached 115 thousand. For diversionary actions during the battle in the center and against the right flank, Napoleon allocated no more than 20 thousand soldiers.

Russian and Soviet sources point to Kutuzov's special plan, which forced Napoleon to attack the left flank. Historian Tarle quotes the exact words of Kutuzov:

However, on the eve of the battle, the 3rd Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st was withdrawn from an ambush behind the left flank by order of Chief of Staff Bennigsen without the knowledge of Kutuzov. Bennigsen's actions are justified by his intention to follow the formal battle plan.

Progress of the battle

Battle for Shevardinsky redoubt

On the eve of the main battle, in the early morning of August 24 (September 5), the Russian rearguard under the command of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, located at the Kolotsky Monastery 8 km west of the location of the main forces, was attacked by the enemy vanguard. A stubborn battle ensued, lasting several hours. After news was received of the enemy's encircling movement, Konovnitsyn withdrew his troops across the Kolocha River and joined the corps occupying a position in the area of ​​the village of Shevardino.

A detachment of Lieutenant General Gorchakov was stationed near the Shevardinsky redoubt. In total, Gorchakov commanded 11 thousand troops and 46 guns. To cover the Old Smolensk Road, 6 Cossack regiments of Major General Karpov 2nd remained.

The enemy, covering the Shevardinsky redoubt from the north and south, tried to encircle the troops of Lieutenant General Gorchakov.

The French broke into the redoubt twice, and each time the infantry of Lieutenant General Neverovsky knocked them out. Dusk was falling on the Borodino field when the enemy once again managed to capture the redoubt and break into the village of Shevardino, but the approaching Russian reserves from the 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions recaptured the redoubt.

The battle gradually weakened and finally stopped. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, ordered Lieutenant General Gorchakov to withdraw his troops to the main forces beyond the Semenovsky ravine.

The Shevardino battle made it possible for Russian troops to gain time to complete defensive work on the Borodino position, and made it possible to clarify the grouping of forces of the French troops and the direction of their main attack.

Start of the battle

The commander of the 1st Western Army, Barclay de Tolly, sent the 1st, 19th and 40th Chasseur Regiments to help, which counterattacked the French, threw them into Kolocha and burned the bridge across the river. As a result of this battle, the French 106th regiment suffered heavy losses.

Bagration's flushes

Around the same time, the French 8th Westphalian Corps under Divisional General Junot made its way through the Utitsky forest to the rear of the flushes. The situation was saved by the 1st cavalry battery of Captain Zakharov, which at that time was heading to the flash area. Zakharov, seeing a threat to the flushes from the rear, hastily turned his guns around and opened fire on the enemy, who was forming up to attack. The 4 infantry regiments of Baggovut's 2nd Corps arrived in time and pushed Junot's corps into the Utitsky forest, inflicting significant losses on it. Russian historians claim that during the second offensive, Junot's corps was defeated in a bayonet counterattack, but Westphalian and French sources completely refute this. According to the recollections of direct participants, Junot’s 8th Corps participated in the battle until the evening.

By the 4th attack at 11 o'clock in the morning, Napoleon had concentrated about 45 thousand infantry and cavalry, and almost 400 guns, against the flushes. Russian historiography calls this decisive attack the 8th, taking into account the attacks of Junot’s corps on the flushes (6th and 7th). Bagration, seeing that the artillery of the flushes could not stop the movement of the French columns, led a general counterattack of the left wing, the total number of troops of which was approximately only 20 thousand people. The onslaught of the first ranks of the Russians was stopped and a fierce hand-to-hand battle ensued, lasting more than an hour. The advantage leaned towards the side of the Russian troops, but during the counterattack, Bagration, wounded by a fragment of a cannonball in the thigh, fell from his horse and was taken from the battlefield. The news of Bagration's wound instantly swept through the ranks of the Russian troops and had a huge impact on the Russian soldiers. Russian troops began to retreat.

On the other side of the ravine there were untouched reserves - the Life Guards Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments. The French, seeing the solid wall of the Russians, did not dare to attack on the move. The direction of the main attack of the French shifted from the left flank to the center, towards the Raevsky battery. At the same time, Napoleon did not stop attacking the left flank of the Russian army. Nansouty's cavalry corps advanced south of the village of Semenovskoye, north of Latour-Maubourg, while General Friant's infantry division rushed from the front to Semenovskoye. At this time, Kutuzov appointed the commander of the 6th Corps, Infantry General Dokhturov, as the commander of the troops of the entire left flank instead of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn. The Life Guards lined up in a square and for several hours repelled the attacks of Napoleon’s “iron horsemen”. The Duki cuirassier division in the south, the Borozdin cuirassier brigade and the 4th Sivers cavalry corps in the north were sent to help the guard. The bloody battle ended in the defeat of the French troops, who were thrown back beyond the Semenovsky Creek ravine.

The advance of the French troops on the left wing was finally stopped.

The French fought fiercely in the battles for the flushes, but all their attacks, except the last one, were repelled by the significantly smaller Russian forces. By concentrating forces on the right flank, Napoleon ensured a 2-3-fold numerical superiority in the battles for flushes, thanks to which, and also due to the wounding of Bagration, the French still managed to push the left wing of the Russian army to a distance of about 1 km. This success did not lead to the decisive result that Napoleon had hoped for.

Battle for Utitsky Kurgan

On the eve of the battle on August 25 (September 6), by order of Kutuzov, the 3rd Infantry Corps of General Tuchkov 1st and up to 10 thousand warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias were sent to the area of ​​​​the Old Smolensk Road. On the same day, 2 more Cossack regiments of Karpov 2nd joined the troops. To communicate with the flushes in the Utitsky forest, the Jaeger regiments of Major General Shakhovsky took up a position.

According to Kutuzov's plan, Tuchkov's corps was supposed to suddenly attack the flank and rear of the enemy from an ambush, fighting for Bagration's flushes. However, early in the morning, Chief of Staff Bennigsen advanced Tuchkov's detachment from an ambush.

Raid of the Cossacks Platov and Uvarov

At a critical moment in the battle, Kutuzov decided to launch a cavalry raid by generals from the cavalry of Uvarov and Platov into the enemy’s rear and flank. By 12 noon, Uvarov’s 1st Cavalry Corps (28 squadrons, 12 guns, a total of 2,500 horsemen) and Platov’s Cossacks (8 regiments) crossed the Kolocha River near the village of Malaya. Uvarov's corps attacked the French infantry regiment and the Italian cavalry brigade of General Ornano in the area of ​​the crossing of the Voyna River near the village of Bezzubovo. Platov crossed the Voina River to the north and, going to the rear, forced the enemy to change position.

Battery Raevsky

The high mound, located in the center of the Russian position, dominated the surrounding area. A battery was installed on it, which at the beginning of the battle had 18 guns. The defense of the battery was entrusted to the 7th Infantry Corps under Lieutenant General Raevsky.

At about 9 a.m., in the midst of the battle for Bagration's flushes, the French launched the first attack on the battery with the forces of the 4th Corps of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, as well as the divisions of Generals Morand and Gerard from the 1st Corps of Marshal Davout. By influencing the center of the Russian army, Napoleon hoped to complicate the transfer of troops from the right wing of the Russian army to Bagration's flushes and thereby ensure his main forces a quick defeat of the left wing of the Russian army. By the time of the attack, the entire second line of troops of Lieutenant General Raevsky, by order of Infantry General Bagration, had been withdrawn to protect the flushes. Despite this, the attack was repulsed by artillery fire.

Kutuzov, noticing the complete exhaustion of Raevsky’s corps, withdrew his troops to the second line. Barclay de Tolly sent the 24th Infantry Division of Major General Likhachev to the battery to defend the battery.

After the fall of Bagration's flushes, Napoleon abandoned the development of an offensive against the left wing of the Russian army. The initial plan to break through the defense on this wing in order to reach the rear of the main forces of the Russian army became meaningless, since a significant part of these troops were out of action in the battles for the flushes themselves, while the defense on the left wing, despite the loss of the flushes, remained undefeated . Noticing that the situation in the center of the Russian troops had worsened, Napoleon decided to redirect forces to the Raevsky battery. However, the next attack was delayed for 2 hours, since at that time Russian cavalry and Cossacks appeared in the rear of the French.

Taking advantage of the respite, Kutuzov moved the 4th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy and the 2nd Cavalry Corps of Major General Korf from the right flank to the center. Napoleon ordered increased fire on the infantry of the 4th Corps. According to eyewitnesses, the Russians moved like machines, closing ranks as they moved. The path of the 4th Corps could be traced by a trail of bodies of the dead.

Having received news of the fall of Raevsky's battery, at 17 o'clock Napoleon moved to the center of the Russian army and came to the conclusion that its center, despite the retreat and contrary to the assurances of his retinue, had not been shaken. After this, he refused requests to bring the guard into the battle. The French offensive on the center of the Russian army stopped.

As of 18:00, the Russian army was still firmly located in the Borodino position, and the French troops failed to achieve decisive success in any of the directions. Napoleon, who believed that " a general who does not maintain fresh troops the day after the battle will almost always be beaten“, never brought his guard into the battle. Napoleon, as a rule, brought the guard into battle at the very last moment, when victory was prepared by his other troops and when it was necessary to deliver a final powerful blow to the enemy. However, assessing the situation at the end of the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon saw no signs of victory, so he did not take the risk of bringing his last reserve into battle.

End of the battle

After the French troops occupied the Raevsky battery, the battle began to subside. On the left flank, Divisional General Poniatovsky carried out ineffective attacks against the 2nd Army under the command of General Dokhturov (the commander of the 2nd Army, General Bagration, was by that time seriously wounded). In the center and on the right flank, matters were limited to artillery fire until 7 pm. Following Kutuzov's report, they claimed that Napoleon retreated, withdrawing troops from captured positions. Having retreated to Gorki (where another fortification remained), the Russians began to prepare for a new battle. However, at 12 o'clock at night, Kutuzov's order arrived, canceling preparations for the battle scheduled for the next day. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army decided to withdraw the army beyond Mozhaisk in order to make up for human losses and better prepare for new battles. Napoleon, faced with the fortitude of the enemy, was in a depressed and anxious mood, as evidenced by his adjutant Armand Caulaincourt (brother of the deceased General Auguste Caulaincourt):

Chronology of the battle

Chronology of the battle. The most significant battles

Designations: † - death or mortal wound, / - captivity, % - wound

There is also an alternative point of view on the chronology of the Battle of Borodino. See, for example,.

Result of the battle

Russian casualty estimates

The number of losses of the Russian army has been repeatedly revised by historians. Different sources give different numbers:

According to the surviving reports from the RGVIA archive, the Russian army lost 39,300 people killed, wounded and missing (21,766 in the 1st Army, 17,445 in the 2nd Army), but taking into account the fact that the data in the reports for various reasons is incomplete (do not include losses of the militia and Cossacks), historians usually increase this number to 44-45 thousand people. According to Troitsky, data from the Military Registration Archive of the General Staff gives a figure of 45.6 thousand people.

French casualty estimates

A significant part of the documentation of the Grand Army was lost during the retreat, so assessing French losses is extremely difficult. The question of the total losses of the French army remains open.

Later studies showed that Denier's data were greatly underestimated. Thus, Denier gives the number of 269 killed officers of the Grand Army. However, in 1899, the French historian Martinien, based on surviving documents, established that at least 460 officers, known by name, were killed. Subsequent research increased this number to 480. Even French historians admit that " since the information given in the statement about the generals and colonels who were out of action at Borodino is inaccurate and underestimated, it can be assumed that the rest of Denier’s figures are based on incomplete data» .

For modern French historiography, the traditional estimate of French losses is 30 thousand with 9-10 thousand killed. Russian historian A. Vasiliev points out, in particular, that the number of losses of 30 thousand is achieved by the following calculation methods: a) by comparing data on the personnel of the surviving statements for September 2 and 20 (deducting one from the other gives a loss of 45.7 thousand) with the deduction losses in vanguard affairs and the approximate number of sick and retarded and b) indirectly - by comparison with the Battle of Wagram, equal in number and in the approximate number of losses among the command staff, despite the fact that the total number of French losses in it, according to Vasiliev, is precisely known (33,854 people, including 42 generals and 1,820 officers; at Borodino, according to Vasiliev, the loss of command personnel is 1,792 people, of which 49 generals).

The French lost 49 generals in killed and wounded, including 8 killed: 2 divisional (Auguste Caulaincourt and Montbrun) and 6 brigade. The Russians had 23 generals out of action, but it should be noted that 70 French generals took part in the battle against 43 Russians (a French brigadier general is closer to a Russian colonel than a major general).

However, V.N. Zemtsov showed that Vasiliev’s calculations are unreliable, since they are based on inaccurate data. Thus, according to the lists compiled by Zemtsov, “ on September 5-7, 1,928 officers and 49 generals were killed and wounded“, that is, the total losses of the command personnel amounted to 1,977 people, and not 1,792, as Vasiliev believed. Vasilyev’s comparison of data on the personnel of the Great Army for September 2 and 20 also, according to Zemtsov, gave incorrect results, since the wounded who returned to duty in the time elapsed after the battle were not taken into account. In addition, Vasiliev did not take into account all parts of the French army. Zemtsov himself, using a technique similar to that used by Vasiliev, estimated French losses for September 5-7 at 38.5 thousand people. Also controversial is the figure used by Vasiliev for the losses of French troops at Wagram, 33,854 people - for example, the English researcher Chandler estimated them at 40 thousand people.

It should be noted that to the several thousand killed should be added those who died from wounds, and their number was enormous. In the Kolotsky Monastery, where the main military hospital of the French army was located, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th linear regiment, Ch. Francois, 3/4 of the wounded died in the 10 days following the battle. French encyclopedias believe that among Borodin's 30 thousand victims, 20.5 thousand died or died from their wounds.

Grand total

Cartographic department of the RSL. Poltoratsky. Military-historical atlas of the wars of 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 / Textbook for military educational institutions. - St. Petersburg: Publishing house of the first private lithography in Russia by Poltoratsky and Ilyin. 1861

The Battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century and the bloodiest of all that came before it. Conservative estimates of total losses indicate that about 2,000 people died on the field every hour. Some divisions lost up to 80% of their strength. The French fired 60 thousand cannon shots and almost one and a half million rifle shots. It is no coincidence that Napoleon called the Battle of Borodino his greatest battle, although its results were more than modest for a great commander accustomed to victories.

The death toll, counting those who died from wounds, was much higher than the official number killed on the battlefield; The casualties of the battle should also include the wounded and later those who died. In the fall of 1812 - spring of 1813, the Russians burned and buried the bodies that remained unburied in the field. According to military historian General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, a total of 58,521 bodies of those killed were buried and burned. Russian historians and, in particular, employees of the museum-reserve on the Borodino Field, estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48-50 thousand people. According to A. Sukhanov, 49,887 dead were buried on the Borodino field and in the surrounding villages (without including the French burials in the Kolotsky Monastery). Both commanders chalked up victory. According to Napoleon's point of view, expressed in his memoirs:

This paragraph was dictated in 1816; a year later, in 1817, Napoleon described the Battle of Borodino as follows:

Memory

Spaso-Borodinsky Monastery

100th anniversary

200th anniversary of the battle

On September 2, 2012, ceremonial events dedicated to the 200th anniversary of the historical battle took place on the Borodino field. They were attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, as well as descendants of the participants in the battle and representatives of the Romanov dynasty. Several thousand people from more than 120 military-historical clubs in Russia, European countries, the USA and Canada took part in the reconstruction of the battle. The event was attended by more than 150 thousand people.

See also

Notes

1. ; The quotation presented by Mikhnevich was compiled by him from a free translation of Napoleon's oral statements. The primary sources do not convey Napoleon’s similar phrase in exactly this form, but the review as edited by Mikhnevich is widely quoted in modern literature.
2. Extract from the notes of General Pele on the Russian War of 1812, “Readings of the Imperial Society for the History of Antiquities”, 1872, I, p. 1-121
3. Some of the bloodiest one-day battles in history (“The Economist” Nov 11th 2008). Archived
4. , With. 71 - 73
5. "Patriotic War and Russian Society." Volume IV. Borodino. Archived from the original on August 5, 2012. Retrieved July 17, 2012.
6. , p. 50
7. Bibliography of N. F. Garnich
8. Chandler, David (1966). The Campaigns of Napoleon. Vol. 1
9. Thiry J. La campagne de Russie. P., 1969
10. Holmes, Richard (1971). Borodino. 1812
11. M. Bogdanovich History of the Patriotic War of 1812. - P. 162.
    Bogdanovich's data is repeated in ESBE.
12. E. V. Tarle. “Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia”, OGIZ, 1943, p. 162
13. Zemtsov V.N. Battle of the Moscow River. - M., 2001.
14. Troitsky N. A. 1812. The Great Year of Russia. M., 1989.
15. Chambray G. Histoire de I'expedition de Russie.P., 1838
16. V. N. Zemtsov “Battle of the Moscow River” M. 2001. pp. 260−265
17. Dupuis R. E., Dupuis T. N. World history of wars. - T. 3. - P. 135-139.
18. Clausewitz, March to Russia 1812: “...on the flank where it was necessary to expect an enemy attack. This, undoubtedly, was the left flank; One of the advantages of the Russian position was that this could be foreseen with complete confidence.”
19. Borodino, Tarle
20. , With. 139
21. Tarle, “Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia”, OGIZ, 1943, p. 167
22. Dupuis R.E., Dupuis T.N - “World History of Wars”, Book Three, p. 140-141
23. Caulaincourt, “Napoleon’s Campaign in Russia”, chapter 3. Archived from the original on August 24, 2011. Retrieved April 30, 2009.
24. Count Philippe-Paul de Segur. Trip to Russia. - M.: “Zakharov”, 2002
25. Inscription on the Main Monument. 2nd side: “1838 - Grateful fatherland who laid their bellies on the field of honor - Russians: Generals Killed - 3 Wounded - 12 Warriors Killed - 15,000 Wounded - 30,000"
26. BATTLE AT KOLOTSK MONASTERY, SHEVARDIN AND BORODINO AUGUST 24 AND 26, 1812 (V). Archived from the original on August 24, 2011. Retrieved April 30, 2009.
27. The historian Tarle in “Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia” repeats these figures from the historians Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky and Bogdanovich)
28. Mikheev S.P. History of the Russian Army. Vol. 3: The era of wars with Napoleon I. - M.: edition of S. Mikheev and A. Kazachkov, 1911. - P. 60

“The RUSSIANS HAVE THE GLORY OF BEING UNDEFEATED”

After the battle of Smolensk, the retreat of the Russian army continued. This caused open discontent in the country. Under pressure from public opinion, Alexander I appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Kutuzov’s task was not only to stop Napoleon’s further advance, but also to expel him from Russian borders. He also adhered to retreat tactics, but the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle, which was found near the village. Borodino, 124 kilometers from Moscow.

The Russian army approached the village of Borodino on August 22, where, at the suggestion of Colonel K.F. Tolya, a flat position with a length of up to 8 km was chosen. On the left flank, the Borodino field was covered by the impenetrable Utitsky forest, and on the right, which ran along the bank of the river. Kolochi, Maslovsky flashes were erected - arrow-shaped earthen fortifications. In the center of the position, fortifications were also built, which received different names: Central, Kurgan Heights, or Raevsky’s battery. Semenov's (Bagration's) flushes were erected on the left flank. Ahead of the entire position, on the left flank, near the village of Shevardino, a redoubt also began to be built, which was supposed to play the role of a forward fortification. However, the approaching army of Napoleon, after a fierce battle on August 24, managed to take possession of it.

Disposition of Russian troops. The right flank was occupied by the battle formations of the 1st Western Army of General M.B. Barclay de Tolly, on the left flank there were units of the 2nd Western Army under the command of P.I. Bagration, and the Old Smolensk Road near the village of Utitsa was covered by the 3rd Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General N.A. Tuchkova. Russian troops occupied a defensive position and were deployed in the shape of the letter "G". This situation was explained by the fact that the Russian command sought to control the Old and New Smolensk roads leading to Moscow, especially since there was a serious fear of the enemy’s outflanking movement from the right. That is why a significant part of the corps of the 1st Army was in this direction. Napoleon decided to deliver his main blow to the left flank of the Russian army, for which on the night of August 26 (September 7), 1812, he transferred the main forces across the river. I pound, leaving only a few cavalry and infantry units to cover my own left flank.

The battle begins. The battle began at five o'clock in the morning with an attack by units of the corps of the Viceroy of Italy E. Beauharnais on the position of the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment near the village. Borodin. The French took possession of this point, but this was their diversionary maneuver. Napoleon launched his main blow against Bagration's army. Marshal Corps L.N. Davout, M. Ney, I. Murat and General A. Junot were attacked several times by Semenov flushes. Units of the 2nd Army fought heroically against an enemy superior in numbers. The French repeatedly rushed into flushes, but each time they abandoned them after a counterattack. Only by nine o'clock did Napoleon's armies finally capture the fortifications of the Russian left flank, and Bagration, who at that time tried to organize another counterattack, was mortally wounded. “The soul seemed to fly away from the entire left flank after the death of this man,” witnesses tell us. Furious rage and a thirst for revenge took possession of those soldiers who were directly in his environment. When the general was already being carried away, cuirassier Adrianov, who served him during the battle (giving him a telescope, etc.), ran up to the stretcher and said: “Your Excellency, they are taking you to treatment, you no longer need me!” Then, eyewitnesses report, “Adrianov, in sight of thousands, took off like an arrow, instantly crashed into the ranks of the enemy and, having hit many, fell dead.”

The fight for Raevsky's battery. After the capture of the flushes, the main struggle unfolded for the center of the Russian position - the Raevsky battery, which at 9 and 11 a.m. was subjected to two strong enemy attacks. During the second attack, E. Beauharnais' troops managed to capture the heights, but soon the French were driven out of there as a result of a successful counterattack by several Russian battalions led by Major General A.P. Ermolov.

At noon, Kutuzov sent the Cossacks cavalry general M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of Adjutant General F.P. Uvarov to the rear of Napoleon's left flank. The Russian cavalry raid made it possible to divert Napoleon's attention and delayed a new French assault on the weakened Russian center for several hours. Taking advantage of the respite, Barclay de Tolly regrouped his forces and placed fresh troops on the front line. Only at two o'clock in the afternoon did Napoleonic units make a third attempt to capture Raevsky's battery. The actions of Napoleonic infantry and cavalry led to success, and soon the French finally captured this fortification. The wounded Major General P.G., who led the defense, was captured by them. Likhachev. The Russian troops retreated, but the enemy was unable to break through the new front of their defense, despite all the efforts of two cavalry corps.

Results of the battle. The French were able to achieve tactical successes in all main directions - the Russian armies were forced to leave their original positions and retreat about 1 km. But Napoleonic units failed to break through the defenses of the Russian troops. The thinned Russian regiments stood to the death, ready to repel new attacks. Napoleon, despite the urgent requests of his marshals, did not dare to throw in his last reserve - the twenty thousandth Old Guard - for the final blow. Intense artillery fire continued until the evening, and then the French units were withdrawn to their original lines. It was not possible to defeat the Russian army. This is what the domestic historian E.V. wrote. Tarle: “The feeling of victory was absolutely not felt by anyone. The marshals were talking among themselves and were unhappy. Murat said that he did not recognize the emperor all day, Ney said that the emperor had forgotten his craft. On both sides, artillery thundered until the evening and bloodshed continued, but the Russians did not think not only of fleeing, but also of retreating. It was already getting very dark. A light rain began to fall. “What are the Russians?” - asked Napoleon. - “They are standing still, Your Majesty.” “Increase the fire, it means they still want it,” the emperor ordered. - Give them more!

Gloomy, not talking to anyone, accompanied by his retinue and generals who did not dare to interrupt his silence, Napoleon drove around the battlefield in the evening, looking with inflamed eyes at the endless piles of corpses. The emperor did not yet know in the evening that the Russians had lost not 30 thousand, but about 58 thousand people out of their 112 thousand; He also did not know that he himself had lost more than 50 thousand of the 130 thousand that he led to the Borodino field. But that he had killed and seriously wounded 47 (not 43, as they sometimes write, but 47) of his best generals, he learned this in the evening. French and Russian corpses covered the ground so thickly that the imperial horse had to look for a place to put its hoof between the mountains of bodies of people and horses. The groans and cries of the wounded came from all over the field. The Russian wounded amazed the retinue: “They did not emit a single groan,” writes one of the retinue, Count Segur, “perhaps, away from their own, they counted less on mercy. But it is true that they seemed more steadfast in enduring pain than the French.”

The literature contains the most contradictory facts about the losses of the parties; the question of the winner is still controversial. In this regard, it should be noted that none of the opponents solved the tasks set for themselves: Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army, Kutuzov failed to defend Moscow. However, the enormous efforts made by the French army were ultimately fruitless. Borodino brought Napoleon bitter disappointment - the outcome of this battle did not at all resemble Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. The bloodless French army was unable to pursue the enemy. The Russian army, fighting on its territory, was able to restore the size of its ranks in a short time. Therefore, Napoleon himself was most accurate in assessing this battle, saying: “Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory. And the Russians have gained the glory of being undefeated.”

RESCRIPT OF ALEXANDER I

“Mikhail Illarionovich! The current state of military circumstances of our active armies, although it was preceded by initial successes, the consequences of these do not reveal to me the rapid activity with which it would be necessary to act to defeat the enemy.

Considering these consequences and extracting the true reasons for this, I find it necessary to appoint one general commander-in-chief over all active armies, whose election, in addition to military talents, would be based on seniority itself.

Your well-known merits, love for the fatherland and repeated experiences of excellent feats acquire you a true right to this power of attorney of mine.

Choosing you for this important task, I ask Almighty God to bless your deeds for the glory of Russian weapons and may the happy hopes that the fatherland places on you be justified.”

KUTUZOV'S REPORT

“The battle of the 26th was the bloodiest of all those known in modern times. We completely won the battlefield, and the enemy then retreated to the position where he came to attack us; but an extraordinary loss on our part, especially due to the fact that the most necessary generals were wounded, forced me to retreat along the Moscow road. Today I am in the village of Nara and must retreat further to meet the troops coming to me from Moscow for reinforcements. The prisoners say that the enemy loss is very great and that the general opinion in the French army is that they lost 40,000 people wounded and killed. In addition to Divisional General Bonami, who was captured, there were others killed. By the way, Davoust is wounded. Rearguard action occurs daily. Now, I have learned that the corps of the Viceroy of Italy is located near Ruza, and for this purpose the detachment of the Adjutant General Wintzingerode went to Zvenigorod in order to close Moscow along that road.”

FROM CAULAINCUR'S MEMOIRS

“Never before have we lost so many generals and officers in one battle... There were few prisoners. The Russians showed great courage; the fortifications and territory which they were forced to cede to us were evacuated in order. Their ranks were not disorganized... they faced death bravely and only slowly succumbed to our brave attacks. There has never been a case where enemy positions were subjected to such furious and systematic attacks and that they were defended with such tenacity. The Emperor repeated many times that he could not understand how the redoubts and positions that were captured with such courage and which we defended so tenaciously gave us only a small number of prisoners... These successes without prisoners, without trophies did not satisfy him... »

FROM THE REPORT OF GENERAL RAEVSKY

“The enemy, having arranged his entire army in our eyes, so to speak, in one column, walked straight to our front; Having approached it, strong columns separated from its left flank, went straight to the redoubt and, despite the strong grapeshot fire of my guns, climbed over the parapet without firing their heads. At the same time, from my right flank, Major General Paskevich with his regiments attacked with bayonets into the left flank of the enemy, located behind the redoubt. Major General Vasilchikov did the same thing to their right flank, and Major General Ermolov, taking a battalion of rangers from the regiments brought by Colonel Vuich, struck with bayonets directly at the redoubt, where, having destroyed everyone in it, he took the general leading the columns prisoner . Major Generals Vasilchikov and Paskevich overturned the enemy columns in the blink of an eye and drove them into the bushes so hard that hardly any of them escaped. More than the action of my corps, it remains for me to describe in a nutshell that after the destruction of the enemy, returning again to their places, they held out in them until against repeated attacks of the enemy, until the killed and wounded were reduced to complete insignificance and my redoubt was already occupied by the General. -Major Likhachev. Your Excellency himself knows that Major General Vasilchikov gathered the scattered remnants of the 12th and 27th divisions and, with the Lithuanian Guards Regiment, held until the evening an important height, located on the left limb of our entire line ... "

GOVERNMENT NOTICE ABOUT LEAVING MOSCOW

“With extreme and crushing heart of every son of the Fatherland, this sadness announces that the enemy entered Moscow on September 3rd. But let the Russian people not lose heart. On the contrary, let each and every one swear to be inflamed with a new spirit of courage, firmness and undoubted hope that all the evil and harm inflicted on us by our enemies will ultimately turn on their head. The enemy occupied Moscow not because he overcame our forces or weakened them. The commander-in-chief, in consultation with the leading generals, decided that it would be useful and necessary to give in for the time of necessity, in order to use the most reliable and best methods to turn the short-term triumph of the enemy into his inevitable destruction. No matter how painful it is for every Russian to hear that the capital city of Moscow contains within itself the enemies of its fatherland; but it contains them empty, naked of all treasures and inhabitants. The proud conqueror hoped, having entered it, to become the ruler of the entire Russian kingdom and prescribe to it such peace as he saw fit; but he will be deceived in his hope and will not find in this capital not only ways to dominate, but also ways to exist. Our forces, gathered and now increasingly accumulating around Moscow, will not cease to block all his paths, and the detachments sent from him for food were exterminated daily, until he sees that his hope of defeating the minds of the capture of Moscow was vain and that, willy-nilly, he will have to open a path for himself from her by force of arms..."